Random matching in adaptive dynamics
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Ellison_Random matching.pdf
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Author(s)
Ellison, Glenn
Fudenberg, Drew
Imhof, Lorens A.
Date Issued
May 2008
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Ellison, Glenn, Drew Fudenberg, and Lorens A. Imhof. “Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics.” Games and Economic Behavior 66, no. 1 (May 2009): 98–114.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has a negligible effect. We study two different senses of this idea, and provide sufficient conditions for each. The less demanding sense corresponds to sending the matching noise to zero while holding fixed all other aspects of the adaptive process. The second sense in which matching noise can be negligible is that it does not alter the limit distribution obtained as the limit of the invariant distributions as an exogenous “mutation rate” goes to zero.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.010
