What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?
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pandp.20181077.pdf
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Published version
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559.09 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Agarwal, Nikhil
Ashlagi, Itai
Azevedo, Eduardo
Featherstone, Clayton
Karaduman, Omer
Date Issued
May 2018
Journal
AEA Papers and Proceedings
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Agarwal, Nikhil, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton Featherstone, and Omer Karaduman. 2018. "What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?" AEA Papers and Proceedings 108: 334–340. Copyright 2020 American Economic Association.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Kidney exchange platforms serve patients who need a kidney transplant and who have a willing, but incompatible, donor. These platforms match patients and donors to produce transplants. This paper documents operational details of the three largest platforms in the United States. It then uses the framework developed in Agarwal et al. (2017) to examine how practical details influence platform productivity. The results show that reducing frictions in accepting proposed matches, frequent matching, and encouraging altruistic donors are important ways in which a platform can increase its productivity.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/PANDP.20181077
