Betrayal as Market Barrier: Identity-Based Limits to Diversification among High-Status Corporate Law Firms
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Author(s)
Phillips, Damon J.
Turco, Catherine
Zuckerman Sivan, Ezra W.
Date Issued
January 2013
Journal
American Journal of Sociology
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Phillips, Damon J., Catherine J. Turco, and Ezra W. Zuckerman. “Betrayal as Market Barrier: Identity-Based Limits to Diversification Among High-Status Corporate Law Firms.” American Journal of Sociology 118, no. 4 (January 2013): 1023–1054. © 2013 The University of Chicago Press
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Why are some diversified market identities problematic but others are not? We examine this question in the context of high-status corporate law firms, which often diversify into one low-status area of work—family law (FL)—but face a barrier (strong disapproval from existing clients) that prevents diversification into another such area—plaintiffs’ personal injury law (PIL). Drawing on a qualitative study of the Boston legal market, we argue that this barrier reflects a situation where loyalty norms have been violated, and it surfaces because service to individual plaintiffs is tantamount to betraying the interests of corporate clients. Our analysis clarifies identity-based limits to diversification, indicating that they are rooted in concerns about the firm’s commitments as well as its capabilities, and suggests a more general refinement of theory on status and conformity.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/668412
