Matching with couples revisited
Name
Ashlagi_Matching with.pdf
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495.14 KB
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Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai
Braverman, Mark
Hassidim, Avinatan
Date Issued
June 2011
Journal
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '11
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Citation
Ashlagi, Itai, Mark Braverman, and Avinatan Hassidim. “Matching with Couples Revisited. [Extended Abstract]” Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC ’11 (2011), June 5-9, 2011, San Jose, California, USA.
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628
