The Chinese Communist Party and regulatory transparency in China's food industry
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pgad028.pdf
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Published version
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Author(s) • • •
Gao, Qihua
Huang, Yasheng
Sui, Yuze
Zheng, Yanchong
Date Issued
March 3, 2023
Journal
PNAS Nexus
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Gao, Qihua, Huang, Yasheng, Sui, Yuze and Zheng, Yanchong. 2023. "The Chinese Communist Party and regulatory transparency in China's food industry." PNAS Nexus, 2 (3).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Abstract
While it is widely accepted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) occupies a dominant position in the Chinese political system, few studies have demonstrated CCP's dominant position based on rigorous statistical analysis. Our paper presents the first such analysis using an innovative measure of regulatory transparency in the food industry across nearly 300 prefectures in China over 10 years. We show that actions by the CCP, while broadly scoped and not targeting the food industry, significantly improved regulatory transparency in the industry. In sharp contrast, food-industry-specific interventions by the State Council, which exercises direct regulatory supervision of the industry, had no impact on regulatory transparency. These results hold in various specifications and robustness checks. Our research contributes to research in China's political system by empirically and explicitly demonstrating the dominating power of the CCP.
While it is widely accepted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) occupies a dominant position in the Chinese political system, few studies have demonstrated CCP's dominant position based on rigorous statistical analysis. Our paper presents the first such analysis using an innovative measure of regulatory transparency in the food industry across nearly 300 prefectures in China over 10 years. We show that actions by the CCP, while broadly scoped and not targeting the food industry, significantly improved regulatory transparency in the industry. In sharp contrast, food-industry-specific interventions by the State Council, which exercises direct regulatory supervision of the industry, had no impact on regulatory transparency. These results hold in various specifications and robustness checks. Our research contributes to research in China's political system by empirically and explicitly demonstrating the dominating power of the CCP.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad028