Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
Name
Ashlagi_Characterizing Vickrey.pdf
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204.75 KB
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8c702b020165fdba8b8d68eae98f3db8
Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Date Issued
May 2011
Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Citation
Ashlagi, Itai, and Shigehiro Serizawa. “Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rule by Anonymity.” Social Choice and Welfare (2011:May) : 1-12.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0535-4
