Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply

Micali, Silvio; Chen, Jing

Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply

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Author(s)

Micali, Silvio

•

Chen, Jing

Advisor(s)

Silvio Micali

Date Issued

December 17, 2008

Series/Report no.

MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074

Abstract

We present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks.

Subjects

Resilient mechanism design

Knowledge-Based Benchmarks

Player-Knowledge Benchmarks

Aggregated Knowledge-Based Benchmarks

Aggregated Player-Knowledge Benchmarks

Persistent DSpace Link

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43947