Belief revision revised
Name
Philos Phenomenol Research - 2025 - Pearson - Belief revision revised.pdf
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877.5 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Pearson, Joshua Edward
Date Issued
July 27, 2025
Journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
Pearson, J. E. (2025). Belief revision revised. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 111, 696–727.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
I outline a novel counterexample to the principle ofbelief revision, Anticipation: if both learning 𝑒 andlearning not-𝑒 would render belief in 𝑝 unjustified, youcannot now be justified in believing 𝑝. If I am right,not only is the leading theory of belief revision false, soare various recently proposed weakenings. I develop anddefend a new theory that correctly predicts the failuresof Anticipation I argue for, predicated on the simpleidea that one is justified in ruling out possibility just incase that possibility is sufficiently improbable.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70037
