Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control
Name
SSRN-id1079712.pdf
Size
185.28 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
b888fc0a6e273b9264cec48a9c305f34
Author(s)
Parker, Geoffrey
Van Alstyne, Marshall
Date Issued
December 31, 2007
Publisher
Cambridge, MA; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Series/Report no.
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4684-08
Abstract
We explore innovation, openness, and the duration of
intellectual property protection in markets characterized by platforms and their ecosystems of complementary applications. We
find that competition among application developers can reduce
innovation while competition among platforms can increase innovation. Developers can be better off submitting to platform
control as opposed to producing for an unsponsored platform.
Although a social planner would open a platform sooner and to
a greater degree than would a private platform sponsor, a platform sponsor’s ability to control downstream innovation gives it
reason to behave more like a social planner. However, if platforms are to perform this role, platform sponsors need longer
duration rights than application developers. Results can inform
antitrust and intellectual property regulation, technological innovation, competition policy, and intellectual property strategy.
Subjects
Sequential Innovation
Platform Economics
IT Systems Design
Copyright and Patent Length
Network Effects
Network Externalities
Persistent DSpace Link
