Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs

Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs

Download

Name

DFudenberg_Rationalization_Appendix.pdf

Size

253.78 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

aeb63b5c5736bacedb0e166b800c58cf

Download

Name

DFudenberg_Rationalization_PartitionConfirmed_Equilibrium_with_Heterogeneous_Beliefs.pdf

Size

712.89 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

3e1ad4a93a0d441fa67fd1b0600193f2

Author(s)

Fudenberg, Drew

•

Kamada, Yuichiro

Date Issued

May 2018

Journal

Games and Economic Behavior

Publisher

Elsevier

Citation

Version

Author's final manuscript

Abstract

Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs, and show how mixed strategies can correspond to heterogeneous play in a large population. We also show that every heterogeneous-belief RPCE can be approximated by a RPCE in a model where every agent in a large pool is a separate player. Keywords: Rationalizability; Extensive-form games; Self-confirming equilibrium; Heterogeneous beliefs; Purification; Random matching

MIT Department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics

Terms of Use

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Persistent DSpace Link

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086

DOI of Published Version

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021