Pretrial negotiations under optimism
Name
pretrial.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
1.27 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
bafe2cd2e870aa7e40290ae103577f8a
Author(s)
Vasserman, Shoshana
Yildiz, Muhamet
Date Issued
April 2019
Journal
RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
Vasserman, Shoshana, and Muhamet Yildiz. “Pretrial Negotiations under Optimism.” The RAND Journal of Economics 50, 2 (June 2019): 359–90.
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12273
