Able to Do the Impossible
Name
non-internet_version_10.pdf
Size
281.18 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
339cbe5bd9d303a6136c1c5a05b470df
Author(s)
Spencer II, John Haven
Date Issued
September 2016
Journal
Mind
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Spencer, Jack. “Able to Do the Impossible.” Mind 126, 502 (September 2016): 466–497 © 2016 Spencer
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to Φ only if it is metaphysically possible for S to Φ. I argue against the poss-abilityprinciple by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/MIND/FZV183
