Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms
Name
eager.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
1.69 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
903da033a11c059c2f0712b2006726b1
Author(s)
Beyhaghi, Hedyeh
Golrezaei, Negin
Leme, Renato Paes
Pál, Martin
Sivan, Balasubramanian
Date Issued
2021
Journal
Operations Research
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Citation
Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, Golrezaei, Negin, Leme, Renato Paes, Pál, Martin and Sivan, Balasubramanian. 2021. "Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms." Operations Research, 69 (6).
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
How to optimize posted price mechanisms? The sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanism is one of the widely used selling mechanisms in practice. In this mechanism, the seller presents each buyer with a price sequentially and the buyer can either accept or reject the mechanism's offer. Despite the widespread use of the SPP mechanism, the problem of optimizing prices in this mechanism has not been fully addressed. In a paper entitled, “Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms,” H. Beyhaghi, N. Golrezaei, R. Paes Leme, M. Pal, and B. Sivan construct SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the optimal mechanism and the other that posts a uniform price (same price for every buyer). Their simple pricing rules can be easily generalized to the setting with multiple units and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1287/OPRE.2021.2121
