Asset sharing and stakeholder arrangements : human capital investments, the distribution of powers, and the role of property rights and economic institutions
Name
881178857-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
4.22 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
73b292c8febb402b7359b1e56803f7a9
Author(s)
Hughes, J. Jerome (Jermaine Jerome)
Advisor(s)
Thomas Anton Kochan.
Date Issued
2014
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Theories of human capital investment, which emphasize encouraging and protecting investments in human capital, have become salient in rationalizing the adoption of firm asset-sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Yet, mechanisms such as bargaining power have also been a key part of the literature on employee and firm bargaining outcomes. Part of the puzzle with bargaining power as an explanation is that not all forms of bargaining power significantly explain the adoption of firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements. In order to provide an improved explanation for the adoption of these arrangements, we utilize distributive conceptions of property rights and economic institutions to highlight how power is allocated, segmented, and distributed by economic institutions and, thus, impacts firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements.
Description
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2014.
Page 74 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 49-59).
Subjects
Sloan School of Management.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
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