Moral status of accidents
Name
Saxe-2016-Moral status of acci.pdf
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529.82 KB
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Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
e359d7f9475408ba99a3b7188778aea8
Author(s)
Saxe, Rebecca R
Date Issued
April 2014
Journal
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences (U.S.)
Citation
Saxe, Rebecca. “Moral Status of Accidents.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 17 (April 14, 2016): 4555–4557. © 2016 National Academy of Sciences (U.S.)
Version
Final published version
Abstract
No one is naive enough to expect that all moral beliefs are universal. Today, some countries legally beat and imprison homosexuals, and others recognize gay marriage; in some places, killing a bull is a sport, and, in others, it is an abomination; in some places, corporal punishment is the obligation of a responsible parent and, in others, grounds for forced removal. Indeed, the burden of proof seems to be on the other side: Is there anything universal about human moral cognition? In PNAS, Barrett et al. (1) test one candidate for a universal principle of human morality: that an action’s moral value depends not only on the action’s consequences but on the person’s intentions.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1604154113
