Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes
Name
78617481-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
2.73 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
0863312c86b8020fee452bb02504c109
Author(s)
Forsythe, Joy Marie
Advisor(s)
Ronald L. Rivest.
Date Issued
2005
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and Andrew Neff have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little research has been done that combines voter verification with homomorphic encryption. This thesis proposes adding voter verification to an existing multi-candidate election scheme (Baudron et al.) that uses Paillier encryption. A "cut and choose" protocol provides a probabilistic guarantee of correctness. The scheme is straightforward, and could easily be extended to multi-authority elections. The feasibility of the proposed scheme is demonstrated via a simple implementation.
Description
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-64).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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