Beyond a series of security nets: applying STAMP & STPA to port security
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12198_2015_161_ReferencePDF.pdf
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554.68 KB
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Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
38aa54e8d673c07ee39de18a4bc8aebc
Author(s)
Williams, Adam David
Date Issued
November 2015
Journal
Journal of Transportation Security
Publisher
Springer US
Citation
Williams, Adam D. “Beyond a Series of Security Nets: Applying STAMP & STPA to Port Security.” Journal of Transportation Security 8, no. 3–4 (November 17, 2015): 139–157.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Port security is an increasing concern given the significant role of ports in global commerce and today’s increasingly complex threat environment. Current approaches to port security mirror traditional models of accident causality – ‘a series of security nets’ based on component reliability and probabilistic assumptions. Traditional port security frameworks result in isolated and inconsistent improvement strategies. Recent work in engineered safety combines the ideas of hierarchy, emergence, control and communication into a new paradigm for understanding port security as an emergent complex system property. The ‘System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP)’ is a new model of causality based on systems and control theory. The associated analysis process – System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) – identifies specific technical or procedural security requirements designed to work in coordination with (and be traceable to) overall port objectives. This process yields port security design specifications that can mitigate (if not eliminate) port security vulnerabilities related to an emphasis on component reliability, lack of coordination between port security stakeholders or economic pressures endemic in the maritime industry. This article aims to demonstrate how STAMP’s broader view of causality and complexity can better address the dynamic and interactive behaviors of social, organizational and technical components of port security.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-015-0161-y
