Public Disagreement
Name
Yildiz_Public disagreement.pdf
Size
2 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
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6e16727948033a7537643c0bbb06ce58
Author(s)
Sethi, Rajiv
Yildiz, Muhamet
Date Issued
August 2012
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Sethi, Rajiv, and Muhamet Yildiz. “Public Disagreement.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 3 (August 2012): 57-95. Copyright 2012 American Economic Association.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We develop a model of deliberation under heterogeneous beliefs and incomplete information, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is eventually aggregated and public beliefs are identical to those arising under observable priors. When priors are independently distributed, however, some private information is never revealed, and communication breaks down entirely in large groups. Interpreting integration in terms of the observability of priors, we show how increases in social integration lead to less divergent public beliefs on average.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.3.57
