Common belief foundations of global games
Name
Yildiz_Common belief.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
345.89 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
47393b57ad0bc5b1e17866fcd166eedb
Author(s)
Morris, Stephen
Shin, Hyun Song
Yildiz, Muhamet
Date Issued
2016
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Citation
Morris, S., H. S. Shin, and M. Yildiz. "Common Belief Foundations of Global Games." Journal of Economic Theory 163 (2016): 826-48.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.. We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. We argue that this is the driving force behind selection results for the specific type spaces in the global games literature.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2016.03.007
