Imprecision in normative domains
Name
809109509-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
6.23 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
d4c5cf034855d75b6c07f75be140df3b
Author(s)
Schoenfield, Miriam
Advisor(s)
Roger White.
Date Issued
2012
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Being rational and being moral can be difficult. However, some theories of rationality and morality make living up to these ideals too difficult by imposing requirements which are excessively rigid. In this dissertation, I defend and explore the implications of relaxing some of these requirements. I first consider the implications of thinking that rational agents' doxastic attitudes can be represented by imprecise, rather than precise probabilities. In defending this position, I develop a distinction between an idealized, and less idealized notion of rationality. I then explore the moral implications of the thought that facts about value cannot be represented by a precise value function. Finally, I defend permissivism, the view that sometimes there is more than one doxastic attitude that it is rationally permissible to adopt given a particular body of evidence, and show that this view has some interesting implications for questions about higher order evidence.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D. in Philosophy)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
Subjects
Linguistics and Philosophy.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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