Can processing demands explain toddlers’ performance in false-belief tasks?
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PNAS-2017-Rubio-Fernández-E3750.pdf
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Author(s)
Jara-Ettinger, Julian
Rubio-Fernandez, Paula
Gibson, Edward A
Date Issued
April 2017
Journal
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences (U.S.)
Citation
Rubio-Fernández, Paula et al. “Can Processing Demands Explain Toddlers’ Performance in False-Belief Tasks?” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, 19 (April 2017): E3750–E3750 © 2017 National Academy of Sciences
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Two-and-a-half-year-olds normally fail standard false-belief tasks. In the classic version, children have to say where a protagonist will look for an apple that, unbeknownst to her, was moved to a new location. Children under 4 generally predict that the protagonist will look for her apple in its current location, rather than where she left it. Setoh, Scott, and Baillargeon (1) argue that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because of their high processing demands, not because young children lack the necessary theory of mind.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1701286114
