Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
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Author(s)
AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila
Angrist, Joshua
Narita, Yusuke
Pathak, Parag
Zarate Vasquez, Roman Andres
Date Issued
May 2017
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
AbdulkadIroğlu, Atila et al. “Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago’s Exam Schools.” American Economic Review 107, 5 (May 2017): 240–245
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.P20171111
