A Theory of Military Dictatorships
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Acemoglu_A theory.pdf
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394.64 KB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, Daron
Ticchi, Davide
Vindigni, Andrea
Date Issued
January 2010
Journal
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. “A Theory of Military Dictatorships.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2010. © 2010 American Economic Association.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once the transition to democracy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.2.1.1
