Fine-Grained Cryptography
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Author(s) • •
Degwekar, Akshay Dhananjai
Vaikuntanathan, Vinod
Vasudevan, Prashant
Date Issued
August 30, 2017
Journal
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016
Publisher
Springer
Citation
Degwekar, Akshay et al. “Fine-Grained Cryptography.” Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9816 (2016): 533–562. © 2016 International Association for Cryptologic Research
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Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Fine-grained cryptographic primitives are ones that are secure against adversaries with an a-priori bounded polynomial amount of resources (time, space or parallel-time), where the honest algorithms use less resources than the adversaries they are designed to fool. Such primitives were previously studied in the context of time-bounded adversaries (Merkle, CACM 1978), space-bounded adversaries (Cachin and Maurer, CRYPTO 1997) and parallel-time-bounded adversaries (Håstad, IPL 1987). Our goal is come up with fine-grained primitives (in the setting of parallel-time-bounded adversaries) and to show unconditional security of these constructions when possible, or base security on widely believed separation of worst-case complexity classes. We show:
1. NC¹-cryptography: Under the assumption that Open image in new window, we construct one-way functions, pseudo-random generators (with sub-linear stretch), collision-resistant hash functions and most importantly, public-key encryption schemes, all computable in NC¹ and secure against all NC¹ circuits. Our results rely heavily on the notion of randomized encodings pioneered by Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz, and crucially, make non-black-box use of randomized encodings for logspace classes.
2. AC⁰-cryptography: We construct (unconditionally secure) pseudo-random generators with arbitrary polynomial stretch, weak pseudo-random functions, secret-key encryption and perhaps most interestingly, collision-resistant hash functions, computable in AC⁰ and secure against all AC⁰ circuits. Previously, one-way permutations and pseudo-random generators (with linear stretch) computable in AC⁰ and secure against AC⁰ circuits were known from the works of Håstad and Braverman.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_19