Selling Cookies
Name
Bonatti_Selling cookies.pdf
Size
666.29 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
d245b84d3f980e9505b13b5e107eb3b5
Author(s)
Bergemann, Dirk
Bonatti, Alessandro
Date Issued
August 2015
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Bergemann, Dirk, and Alessandro Bonatti. “Selling Cookies.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 3 (August 2015): 259–294. © 2015 by the American Economic Association
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about individual consumers' characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targeting policies. The optimal query price influences the composition of the targeted set. The price of data decreases with the reach of the database and increases with the fragmentation of data sales.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140155
