Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey
Name
Kajii-Morris2020_Article_RefinementsAndHigher-orderBeli.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
3.24 MB
Format
Unknown
Checksum (MD5)
e3a1ed857999d1ae941379c506abf890
Author(s)
Kajii, Atsushi
Morris, Stephen
Date Issued
2020
Journal
The Japanese Economic Review
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Version
Final published version
Abstract
© 2020, Japanese Economic Association. This paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a “canonical” way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple “complete theory” interpretation (Kreps in Game theory and economic modelling. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the “higher-order beliefs literature” (Rubinstein in Am Econ Rev 79:385–391, 1989; Monderer and Samet in Games Econ Behav 1:170–190, 1989; Morris et al. in Econ J Econ Soc 63:145–157, 1995; Kajii and Morris in Econ J Econ Soc 65:1283–1309, 1997a) and the “payoff uncertainty approach” (Fudenberg et al. in J Econ Theory 44:354–380, 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg in J Econ Theory 52:243–267, 1990).
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/S42973-019-00006-X
