Saving and Dissaving With Hyperbolic Discounting
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w24257.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
455.1 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
1612595052a526ce5de9fbd91e83bb56
Author(s)
Cao, Dan
Werning, Ivan
Date Issued
May 2018
Journal
Econometrica
Publisher
Econometric Society
Citation
Cao, Dan and Iván Werning. "Saving and Dissaving With Hyperbolic Discounting." Econometrica 86, 3 (May 2018): 805-857 © 2018 The Econometric Society
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Is the standard hyperbolic-discounting model capable of robust qualitative predictions for savings behavior? Despite results suggesting a negative answer, we provide a positive one. We give conditions under which all Markov equilibria display either saving at all wealth levels or dissaving at all wealth levels. Moreover, saving versus dissaving is determined by a simple condition comparing the interest rate to a threshold made up of impatience parameters only. Our robustness results illustrate a well-behaved side of the model and imply that qualitative behavior is determinate, dissipating indeterminacy concerns to the contrary (Krusell and Smith, 2003). We prove by construction that equilibria always exist and that multiplicity is present in some cases, highlighting that our robust predictions are not due to uniqueness. Similar results may be obtainable in related dynamic games, such as political economy models of public spending.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Sloan School of Management
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15112
