Must . . . stay . . . strong!
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shatner-postprint.pdf
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570.98 KB
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Author(s)
von Fintel, Kai
Gillies, Anthony S.
Date Issued
May 2010
Journal
Natural Language Semantics
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
von Fintel, Kai, and Anthony S. Gillies. “Must . . . Stay . . . Strong!” Natural Language Semantics 18.4 (2010) : 351-383.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must.
Description
This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2
