Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Name
1409.4150.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
1.08 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
36118c6d72011c043144a5bb7a58d525
Author(s)
Daskalakis, Constantinos
Deckelbaum, Alan T
Tzamos, Christos
Date Issued
May 2017
Journal
Econometrica
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Citation
Daskalakis, Constantinos, et al. “Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist.” Econometrica, 85, 3 (May, 2017): 735–67.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple‐good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure µ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand‐bundling mechanisms, strengthening several results in the literature, where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived. As an application, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c,c,+1] is a grand‐bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for two items Pavlov, 2011. At the same time, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c,c+1] is not a grand‐bundling mechanism.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12618
