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Modular Verification of Secure and Leakage-Free Systems: From Application Specification to Circuit-Level Implementation

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Author(s)
Athalye, Anish
•
Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry
•
Kaashoek, Frans
•
Tassarotti, Joseph
•
Zeldovich, Nickolai
Date Issued
November 4, 2024
Publisher
ACM|ACM SIGOPS 30th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles
Citation
Athalye, Anish, Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry, Kaashoek, Frans, Tassarotti, Joseph and Zeldovich, Nickolai. 2024. "Modular Verification of Secure and Leakage-Free Systems: From Application Specification to Circuit-Level Implementation."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Parfait is a framework for proving that an implementation of a hardware security module (HSM) leaks nothing more than what is mandated by an application specification. Parfait proofs cover the software and the hardware of an HSM, which catches bugs above the cycle-level digital circuit abstraction, including timing side channels. Parfait's contribution is a scalable approach to proving security and non-leakage by using intermediate levels of abstraction and relating them with transitive information-preserving refinement. This enables Parfait to use different techniques to verify the implementation at different levels of abstraction, reuse existing verified components such as CompCert, and automate parts of the proof, while still providing end-to-end guarantees. We use Parfait to verify four HSMs, including an ECDSA certificate-signing HSM and a password-hashing HSM, on top of the OpenTitan Ibex and PicoRV32 processors. Parfait provides strong guarantees for these HSMs: for instance, it proves that the ECDSA-on-Ibex HSM implementation---2,300 lines of code and 13,500 lines of Verilog---leaks nothing more than what is allowed by a 40-line specification of its behavior.
Description
SOSP ’24, November 4–6, 2024, Austin, TX
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/157857
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1145/3694715.3695956
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