Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework
Name
861700986-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
9.1 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
7faad7d74caebf28c5111843f6871797
Author(s)
Cai, Yang, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Advisor(s)
Constantinos Daskalakis.
Date Issued
2013
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
A modern engineering system, e.g. the Internet, faces challenges from both the strategic behavior of its self-interested participants and the inherent computational intractability of large systems. Responding to this challenge, a new field, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, has emerged. One of the most fundamental problems in this field is How to optimize revenue in an auction? In his seminal paper [Mye81], Myerson gives a partial solution to this problem by providing a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to muLtiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central open problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient. Our solution proposes a novel framework for mechanism design by reducing mechanism design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "rational inputs" ) to algorithm design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "honest inputs"). Our reduction is generic and provides a framework for many other mechanism design problems.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 168-175).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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