A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots
Name
BaekBalakrishnan_IEEE_ITS2019.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
4.97 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
5e4840376fefa36748a24c6cb685d05c
Author(s)
Baek, Jackie
Balakrishnan, Hamsa
Baek, Jackie
Date Issued
September 2020
Journal
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
Baek, Jackie and Hamsa Balakrishnan. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots." IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 21, 9 (September 2020): 3909 - 3922 © 2020 IEEE
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
As airport arrival capacities increasingly constrain the air transportation system, there is a need for mechanisms by which airlines can exchange landing slots amongst each other. We analyze two such mechanisms, scaled airline preferences and two-for-two trades, from a game-theoretic perspective. This paper investigates the extent to which strategic behavior on part of the airlines can impact the performance of each mechanism. In addition to increasing system efficiency, the reallocation mechanisms should exhibit desirable fairness and incentive properties, notions that we formally investigate in this paper. We show that neither mechanism has good incentive properties, and we develop simple, non-truthful strategies that airlines can use. Our empirical results show that for the scaled airline preferences mechanism, the best performing strategy depends greatly on the extent to which fairness is enforced. For the two-for-two trades mechanism, a simple threshold strategy can yield significant cost savings relative to the best-response strategy, and system efficiency increases when all airlines use the threshold strategy in equilibrium.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2019.2938669
