Rational monism and rational pluralism
Name
SPERMA-4v1.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
515.7 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
df37b2b8b7ec0e02bb320b945a3924bb
Author(s)
Spencer, Jack
Date Issued
July 2020
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Spencer, Jack. “Rational monism and rational pluralism.” Philosophical Studies, 106, 3 (July 2020) © 2020 The Author
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01509-9
