Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players
Name
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061.pdf
Size
197.51 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
31f484159b10322b3c83442d5e1590d6
Author(s)
Micali, Silvio
Chen, Jing
Advisor(s)
Silvio Micali
Date Issued
December 4, 2009
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061
Abstract
We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent.
Subjects
rationally robust implementation
Virtual implementation
perfectly informed players
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