The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States
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11151_2024_Article_9973.pdf
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Author(s)
Joskow, Paul L.
Date Issued
June 17, 2024
Journal
Review of Industrial Organization
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Joskow, P.L. The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States. Rev Ind Organ (2024).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
I examine developments in the application of performance-based regulation (PBR) to electricity distribution and transmission in the United States. Applications of comprehensive PBR to electricity distribution had been slow to diffuse in the U.S. prior to roughly 2000. PBR mechanisms are now being applied more frequently to electricity distribution, which reflects the changing structure of the electric power industry and the increasing obligations that are being placed on electric distribution companies. The new obligations are a consequence primarily of aggressive targets for decarbonizing the electricity sector in nearly half the states and the goal of using “clean” electricity to electrify transportation, buildings, and other sectors. PBR should be viewed as a set of “building blocks” that can be adopted in various combinations and should recognize that PBR and traditional cost-of-service regulation (COSR) are properly viewed as complements rather than substitutes. Recent reforms in the regulation of distribution companies in Great Britain—“RIIO”—have been influential in the U.S. The main reforms contained in RIIO are discussed. There has been essentially no application of PBR by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to owners of transmission assets or to independent transmission operators. FERC has applied targeted incentives to encourage investment in transmission facilities and membership in independent system operator organizations. However, the regulation of transmission rates relies primarily on COSR in the form of formula rates and has poor incentive properties. Regulation of independent system operators is a challenge because they are non-profit organizations with no equity to put at risk. Reforms here are suggested.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09973-x
