Optimal policing with (and without) criminal search
Name
10058_2024_Article_356.pdf
Size
680.9 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
e7716d6166f4c476c388b735fd9fcb7e
Author(s)
Gao, Carol
Vásquez, Jorge
Date Issued
June 24, 2024
Journal
Review of Economic Design
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Gao, C., Vásquez, J. Optimal policing with (and without) criminal search. Rev Econ Design (2024).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We develop a search-theoretic model, in which a police agency allocates scarce resources across neighborhoods—heterogeneous in “vigilance” and valuables—to minimize crime, while potential criminals decide whether, and if so, when and where to commit a crime. When criminals sequentially search for the best target, the optimal police allocation depends on the difference in vigilance levels across neighborhoods, prioritizing neighborhoods with low vigilance. However, in the absence of criminal search, the optimal allocation depends on the degree of rent inequality among neighborhoods, with a priority placed on neighborhoods with higher rents. We also identify conditions under which policing all neighborhoods equally is optimal. Our findings underscore that an optimal policing design must not only consider neighborhood characteristics but also other factors that may impact criminals’ decision-making, including whether they engage in active search.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00356-y
