On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
Name
vtp_wp55.pdf
Size
170.8 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
4d2077d4dafad0fc0dcf9847a4dd2a87
Author(s)
Rivest, Ronald L.
Date Issued
April 29, 2007
Publisher
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project
Series/Report no.
VTP Working Paper Series;55
Abstract
We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest methods for picking a sample of precincts to audit that takes precinct size into account. one method yields optimal auditing strategies together with an exact measure of its effectiveness (probability of detecting corruption of a given size).
We restrict attention to basic auditing strategies, in which each precinct P is audited independently with some probability p determined by the auditor. The auditing probability for a precinct will depend on the size of the precinct, with larger precincts audited more frequently; when all precincts have the same size they will have the same probability of being audited.
Subjects
Auditing elections
Precinct sizes
Sampling
Auditing strategies
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