Algorithmic Management and the Social Order of Digital Markets
Name
11186_2024_Article_9555.pdf
Size
916.23 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
aab78736860b0787c273dc749c346f2c
Author(s)
Rilinger, Georg
Date Issued
May 13, 2024
Journal
Theory and Society
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Rilinger, G. Algorithmic Management and the Social Order of Digital Markets. Theor Soc (2024).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Platform companies use techniques of algorithmic management to control their users. Though digital marketplaces vary in their use of these techniques, few studies have asked why. This question is theoretically consequential. Economic sociology has traditionally focused on the embedded activities of market actors to explain competitive and valuation dynamics in markets. But restrictive platforms can leave little autonomy to market actors. Whether or not the analytical focus on their interactions makes sense thus depends on how restrictive the platform is, turning the question into a first order analytical concern. The paper argues that we can explain why platforms adopt more and less restrictive architectures by focusing on the design logic that informs their construction. Platforms treat markets as search algorithms that blend software computation with human interactions. If the algorithm requires actors to follow narrow scripts of behavior, the platform should become more restrictive. This depends on the need for centralized computation, the degree to which required inputs can be standardized, and the misalignment of interests between users. The paper discusses how these criteria can be mobilized to explain the architectures of four illustrative cases.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-024-09555-6
