Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain
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Byrne_hillonpain.pdf
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115.23 KB
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Author(s)
Byrne, Alex
Date Issued
September 2011
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
Citation
Byrne, Alex. “Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain.” Philosophical Studies (2011): p. 1-8.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
1 Pain perception
Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable
difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to
dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is
devoted to outlining a perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of
Armstrong and Pitcher.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5
