A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions

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Author(s)
Chiesa, Alessandro
•
Micali, Silvio
•
Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
Advisor(s)
Silvio Micali
Date Issued
September 7, 2012
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2012-028
Abstract
We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include his true one.
Subjects
Knightian Auctions
Probabilistic Mechanisms
Social Welfare
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