Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?
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Nielsen_Rewards for.pdf
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207.77 KB
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Author(s)
Simmons, Beth A.
Nielsen, Richard Alexander
Date Issued
June 2014
Journal
International Studies Quarterly
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons, Inc/International Studies Association
Citation
Nielsen, Richard A., and Beth A. Simmons. “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?” International Studies Quarterly (June 2014): p.1-12.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Among the explanations for state ratification of human rights treaties, few are more common and widely accepted than the conjecture that states are rewarded for ratification by other states. These rewards are expected to come in the form of tangible benefits—foreign aid, trade, and investment—and intangible benefits such as praise, acceptance, and legitimacy. Surprisingly, these explanations for ratification have never been tested empirically. We summarize and clarify the theoretical underpinnings of “reward-for-ratification” theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased international aid, economic agreements, and public praise and recognition following ratification of four prominent human rights treaties. We find almost no evidence that states can expect increased tangible or intangible rewards after ratification. Given the lack of empirical support, alternative explanations seem more appealing for understanding human rights treaty ratification.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12142
