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  4. The power of fragmented elites: the role of inadvertent robust action

The power of fragmented elites: the role of inadvertent robust action

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Author(s)
Mizruchi, Mark S.
•
Chu, Johan S. G.
Date Issued
April 9, 2025
Journal
Theory and Society
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Mizruchi, M.S., Chu, J.S.G. The power of fragmented elites: the role of inadvertent robust action. Theor Soc 54, 475–506 (2025).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
It is broadly accepted among political scientists, political sociologists, and social movement theorists that a unified group will have a higher probability of success than a group that experiences internal divisions or fragmentation. Similarly, it has been assumed that in a society with a relatively unified elite, the elite will experience disproportionately higher benefits relative to the larger population. We take issue with this claim. In the mid-twentieth century, large American corporations exhibited a relatively high level of unity but the relative economic benefits accruing to the elite were at historic lows. In more recent years, American big business has become increasingly fragmented, yet the economic benefits that these elites have received have reached historic highs, and the average American’s standard of living has stagnated. Drawing on Padgett and Ansell, we introduce the concept of inadvertent robust action to explain how a relatively fragmented, disorganized elite can reap benefits that exceed those that its more unified counterparts experienced in an earlier era. We conclude with a discussion of the conditions under which our formulation can be expected to hold.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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Creative Commons Attribution
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/163661
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-025-09617-3
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