Coalitional game with opinion exchange
Name
1709.01432.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
459.76 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
1252360ef31a53d9d2e3dd5573347b4f
Author(s)
Jiang, Bomin
Roozbehani, Mardavij
Dahleh, Munther A
Date Issued
January 2018
Journal
IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
Jiang, Bomin et al. "Coalitional game with opinion exchange." IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), December 2017, Melbourne, Australia, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, January 2018. © 2017 IEEE
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in which players can exchange opinions about their views of payoff functions and then decide the distribution of the value of the grand coalition. When all players are truth-telling, the problem of opinion consensus is decoupled from the coalitional game, but interesting dynamics will arise when players are strategic in the consensus phase. Assuming that all players are rational, the model implies that, if influential players are risk-averse, an efficient fusion of the distributed data is achieved at pure strategy Nash equilibrium, meaning that the average opinion will not drift. Also, without the assumption that all players are rational, each player can use an algorithmic R-learning process, which gives the same result as the pure strategy Nash equilibrium with rational players.
MIT Department
MIT Schwarzmann College of Computing
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2017.8264400
