Knowing to infinity: Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle
Name
Philos Phenomenol Research - 2025 - Fiat - Knowing to infinity Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle.pdf
Size
2.1 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
a9feeb09862cb8fa4638153961db3ea9
Author(s)
Fiat, Yonathan
Date Issued
March 18, 2025
Journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
Fiat, Y. (2025). Knowing to infinity: Full knowledge and the margin-for-error principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 110, 1083–1113.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Let’s say that I fully know that 𝑝 if I know that 𝑝, I knowthat I know that 𝑝, I know that I know that I knowthat 𝑝, and so on. Let’s say that I partially know that 𝑝if I know that 𝑝 but I don’t fully know that 𝑝. What,if anything, do I fully know? What, if anything, do Ipartially know? One response in the literature is that Ifully know everything that I know; partial knowledgeis impossible. This response is in tension with a plausi-ble margin-for-error principle on knowledge. A differentresponse in the literature is that I don’t fully know any-thing; everything that I know, I partially know. Recently,Goldstein (forthcoming, 2024) defended a third view,according to which I fully know some things and I par-tially know other things. While this seems plausible,Goldstein’s account is based on denying the margin-for-error principle. In this paper, I show that the possibilityof both full knowledge and partial knowledge is consis-tent with the margin-for-error principle. I also argue thatthe resulting picture of knowledge is well-motivated.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70001
