Telecommunications Deregulation
Name
Hausman_Telecommunications deregulation.pdf
Size
1 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
9d4e3f28016f1422ea45dd0d8729fcc4
Author(s)
Taylor, William E
Hausman, Jerry A.
Date Issued
May 2012
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Hausman, Jerry A, and William E Taylor. “Telecommunications Deregulation.” American Economic Review 102, no. 3 (May 2012): 386-390. © 2012 the American Economic Association
Version
Final published version
Abstract
From Fred Kahn's writings and experiences as a telecommunications regulator and commenter, we draw the following conclusions: prices must be informed by costs; costs are actual incremental costs; costs and prices are an outcome of a Schumpeterian competitive process, not the starting point; excluding incumbents from markets is fundamentally anticompetitive; and a regulatory transition to deregulation entails propensities to micromanage the process to generate preferred outcomes, visible competitors and expedient price reductions. And most important, where effective competition takes place among platforms characterized by sunk investment—land-line telephony, cable and wireless—traditional regulation is unnecessary and likely to be anticompetitive.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.386
