Exploiting Faraday rotation to jam quantum key distribution via polarized photons
Name
1905.01359.pdf
Description
Submitted version
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382.89 KB
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Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
084c4925947af669cbbfce1bce4a3121
Author(s) • •
Daschner, Maximilian
Kaiser, David I
Formaggio, Joseph A
Date Issued
2019
Journal
Quantum Information and Computation
Publisher
Rinton Press
Citation
Daschner, Maximilian, Kaiser, David I and Formaggio, Joseph A. 2019. "Exploiting Faraday rotation to jam quantum key distribution via polarized photons." Quantum Information and Computation, 19 (15&16).
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) involving polarized photons could be vulnerable to a jamming (or denial-of-service) attack, in which a third party applies an external magnetic field to rotate the plane of polarization of photons headed toward one of the two intended recipients. Sufficiently large Faraday rotation of one of the polarized beams would prevent Alice and Bob from establishing a secure quantum channel. We investigate requirements to induce such rotation both for free-space transmission and for transmission via optical fiber, and find reasonable ranges of parameters in which a jamming attack could be successful against fiber-based QKD, even for systems that implement automated recalibration for polarization-frame alignment. The jamming attack could be applied selectively and indefinitely by an adversary without revealing her presence, and could be further combined with various eavesdropping attacks to yield unauthorized information.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Physics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.26421/QIC19.15-16-4