China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure
Name
Fravel_China's Search.pdf
Size
207.38 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
a1669e71f7e530f8f8a0fc9b740e6464
Author(s)
Medeiros, Evan S.
Fravel, Maris Taylor
Date Issued
September 2010
Journal
International Security
Publisher
MIT Press for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Citation
Fravel, M. Taylor, and Evan S. Medeiros. “China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure.” International Security 35.2 (2011): 48-87. © 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
After exploding its first nuclear device in 1964, China did not develop sufficient forces or doctrine to overcome its vulnerability to a first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union for more than three decades. Two factors explain this puzzling willingness to live with nuclear vulnerability: (1) the views and beliefs of senior leaders about the utility of nuclear weapons and the requirements of deterrence, and (2) internal organizational and political constraints on doctrinal innovation. Even as China's technical expertise grew and financial resources for modernization became available after the early 1980s, leadership beliefs have continued to shape China's approach to nuclear strategy, reflecting the idea of assured retaliation (i.e., using the fewest number of weapons to threaten an opponent with a credible second strike). The enduring effect of these leadership ideas has important implications for the trajectory of China's current efforts to modernize its nuclear force.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Security Studies Program
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00016
