Collaborating
Name
aer.101.2.pdf
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1020.87 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
8a605f348f633ae4fa15e26455089631
Author(s)
Bonatti, Alessandro
Horner, Johannes
Date Issued
April 2011
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Bonatti, Alessandro, and Johannes Hörner. 2011. "Collaborating." American Economic Review, 101(2): 632–63.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in a project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. Collaboration among agents dwindles over time, but does not cease as long as the project has not succeeded. In addition, the delay until the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. We show why deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.632
