Vpriv: Protecting Privacy in Location-Based Vehicular Services
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Balakrishnan_Protecting Privacy.pdf
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Author(s)
Papa, Raluca Ada
Balakrishnan, Hari
Date Issued
January 2009
Journal
Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Publisher
USENIX Association
Citation
Popa, Raluca Ada, Hari Balakrishnan and Andrew J. Blumberg. "Vpriv: Protecting Privacy in Location-Based Vehicular Services." Proceedings of the 18th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium. Montreal, Canada. August 10-14, 2009.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
A variety of location-based vehicular services are currently
being woven into the national transportation infrastructure
in many countries. These include usage- or
congestion-based road pricing, traffic law enforcement,
traffic monitoring, “pay-as-you-go” insurance, and vehicle
safety systems. Although such applications promise
clear benefits, there are significant potential violations
of the location privacy of drivers under standard implementations
(i.e., GPS monitoring of cars as they drive,
surveillance cameras, and toll transponders).
In this paper, we develop and evaluate VPriv, a system
that can be used by several such applications without
violating the location privacy of drivers. The starting
point is the observation that in many applications,
some centralized server needs to compute a function of a
user’s path—a list of time-position tuples. VPriv provides
two components: 1) the first practical protocol
to compute path functions for various kinds of tolling,
speed and delay estimation, and insurance calculations
in a way that does not reveal anything more than the result
of the function to the server, and 2) an out-of-band
enforcement mechanism using random spot checks that
allows the server and application to handle misbehaving
users. Our implementation and experimental evaluation
of VPriv shows that a modest infrastructure of a
few multi-core PCs can easily serve 1 million cars. Using
analysis and simulation based on real vehicular data
collected over one year from the CarTel project’s testbed
of 27 taxis running in the Boston area, we demonstrate
that VPriv is resistant to a range of possible attacks.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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