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Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity
Name
pol.20180167.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
639.02 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
be4ef9462ec763c8c5c8706cbf0047c8
Author(s)
Frakes, Michael
Gruber, Jonathan
Date Issued
2019
Journal
AEJ: Economic Policy
Publisher
American Economic Association
Version
Final published version
Abstract
© 2019 American Economic Association. We estimate the extent of defensive medicine by physicians, embracing the no- liability counterfactual made possible by the structure of liability rules in the Military Health System. Active- duty patients seeking treatment from military facilities cannot sue for harms resulting from negligent care, while protections are provided to dependents treated at military facilities and to all patients-active duty or not-that receive care from civilian facilities. Drawing on this variation and exploiting exogenous shocks to care location choices stemming from base- hospital closures, we find suggestive evidence that liability immunity reduces inpatient spending by 5 percent with no measurable negative effect on patient outcomes.
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
10.1257/pol.20180167
